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THE CHILD AS OTHER: RACE AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Kenneth B. Nunn*
INTRODUCTION
Adolescence may be described as a period of transition from child-
hood to adulthood, when those yet to become adults gain greater
physical and mental abilities than children, but continue to lack the
wisdom and judgment possessed by mature adults. This symposium
has been given the title The End of Adolescence. Many of the articles
in this volume focus on a growing trend to shorten the period of ado-
lescence, or to eliminate it entirely. But insofar as African American
boys and girls are concerned, it is somewhat inaccurate to speak of an
"end of adolescence." For to have an "end" suggests there was a "be-
ginning," and there was no beginning of adolescence for African
American youth. The concept of a group of young people who were
entitled to special treatment because they were impetuous and imma-
ture was never extensive enough to include African American
children.
Indeed, there was no "adolescence" as such in the United States
until about 1830.1 Prior to that time, children were viewed as the
property of their parents and were mainly valued as a source of cheap
labor.2 One historian claims that "[i]n labor scarce America the ser-
vices or wages of a child over ten was one of the most valuable assets a
man could have."'3 While adolescent children were valued, and per-
haps even loved by their families, there was no social category that
recognized their existence, and they had no political or social rights. 4
This predominately materialistic view of childhood began to change in
the early nineteenth century. Due to a variety of factors-increased
wealth for the American white middle-class, increased urbanization,
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. A.B., 1980, Stanford Univer-
sity; J.D., 1984, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall).
1. Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment
in Early American Child Support Law. 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1129 (1999).
2. Id.
3. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHERS PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TH4E HISTORY OF
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 6 (1994).
4. See VIVIANA A ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE
OF CHILDREN (1985).
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greater industrialization, and the rise of transcendentalist thought-
new attitudes about children and society's obligation to them began to
arise. By 1830, the view that childhood was a distinct stage of life
committed to learning and development had come into vogue.5 As a
consequence, white child labor became disfavored, and the first child
labor laws were enacted. 6
When adolescence began for white children in 1830, African Ameri-
can children remained slaves. 7 They, like African American adults,
were property, and a much lower class of property than that to which
white children were relegated prior to 1830.8 "[T]he idealization of
white children that occurred in the 1830s did not affect [B]lack chil-
dren at all." 9 Black10 children who were living in slavery had no legal
rights.1' Their connection to their family was not even respected.
They could be separated from their parents and sold away whenever
the slaveholder so desired. 12 African American children's only so-
cially recognized function was to work at hard labor for the economic
benefit of whites. Even after the end of slavery, the social distinction
between white and Black children remained. In fact, within a few
years of the Civil War, Southern legislatures enacted "apprenticeship"
statutes that allowed former slaveholders to force African American
children back into virtual slavery.' 3 Although most apprenticeship
statutes were repealed by the 1870s, African American children con-
tinued to work on farms and in factories in much greater numbers and
at much greater risks than white children.
The different perception and treatment of African American chil-
dren thus has deep historical roots in the United States. Indeed, the
5. Id.; JACQUELINE S. REINIER, FROM VIRTUE rO CHARACIER: AMERICAN CHILDHOOD,
1775-1850 72-73, 134-38 (1996); Hansen, supra note 1, at 1129.
6. Hansen, supra note 1, at 1130.
7. For treatments of the conditions of Black children during slavery, see generally, WILMA
KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD (1997) and MARIE JENKINS SCHWARTz, BORN IN BONDAGE: GROW-
IN( tiP ENSLAVED IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2000).
8. Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW &
INFO. J. 187, 208, 211 (1987).
9. Hansen, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
10. 1 use "Black" and "African" interchangeably throughout this article to refer to persons
who are of African descent. "Black" denotes racial and cultural identity rather than mere physi-
cal appearance and is, therefore, capitalized. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race,
Ideology, and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 64 n.7 (1993). When it
is necessary to distinguish African people resident in the United States from African people
elsewhere, I will use the term "African American." I utilize this convention to emphasize the
connectedness of all members of the African diaspora.
1. Burnham, supra note 8, at 204.
12. Id. at 203-04.
13. Hansen, supra note 1, at 1143.
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racial disparities in the vision of childhood is so glaringly apparent
that it changes the nature of the research hypothesis of this sympo-
sium. The question for children of African descent in the United
States is not "why the end of adolescence," but rather "why never the
beginning?" In this Article, I will address this revised research ques-
tion by analyzing the way African American children are perceived in
American culture at large. I argue that African American children
are not afforded the same treatment as European American children,
and consequently never enjoyed the benefits of adolescence because
they are viewed differently by white society. 14 African American chil-
dren are viewed as children of "the other," and as "others," they may
be treated in ways that would be unthinkable if white children were
involved. 15
The "other" is a concept that has been addressed in a variety of
sources, but it is most commonly associated with postmodern thinking
and analysis. 16 As I explain elsewhere in this Article, the "other" is
the reflection or antithesis of the self. 17 Whatever qualities the self is
thought to have, the "other" has the opposite. In this way, the
"other" is a tool for defining the self and the reality with which the
self engages. The quality of otherness that engulfs African American
children is such that African American children define the boundaries
of childhood, adulthood, delinquency, and crime.
The juvenile justice system is rife with racial disparities between
white and non-white children.' 8 By virtually every means of measure-
ment, African American, Latino, and Native American children re-
ceive much harsher treatment than do European American children. 19
They are more likely to be arrested, charged, to receive more severe
14. See infra notes I 19-130 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
18. See generally JANICE JOSEPH, BLACK YOUTHS, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
(1995); MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Kimberly Kempf Leonard, Carl E. Pope & William H.
Feyerham, eds., 1995); Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice
Decision-Making: Findings of a State-Wide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 405
(1996) (finding "clear disadvantages for nonwhites at multiples stages" of Florida's juvenile jus-
tice system); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of
Overenforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1005, 1020-27 (2001) (discussing various studies finding
race discrimination in the juvenile justice system); Eileen Poe-Yamagata & Michael A. Jones,
And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Minority Youth in the Justice System (Building
Blocks for Youth, 2000), reprinted in 8 Ky. CHILDREN'S RTrS. J. (2000), (concluding that
"[m]inority youth are more likely than White youth to become involved in the system with their
overrepresentation increasing at each stage of the process").
19. See Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 4.
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sentences, and to stand trial as adults. 20 I trace this disparate treat-
ment to the process of "othering," which has deep historic and cul-
tural roots.21 When children in the juvenile justice system are viewed
as the children of the "other," the juvenile justice system is employed
as an instrument of repression and control. Viewing the juvenile jus-
tice system as a means of repression and control provides a greater
explanation for the racial disparities that exist within it than can be
provided by theories of either retribution or rehabilitation.
In this Article, I will focus on the treatment of African American
children as the "other" in the juvenile justice system. As previously
stated, African American children are not the only ones who may be
treated as the "other." Latino, Native American, Asian, and even
white children may be "othered" in the appropriate social context.
My concern here, however, is with African American children. I focus
on their condition because I believe it is exemplary of how all children
who are perceived as children of the "other" are treated and because,
in some ways, the treatment of African American children, in a bipo-
lar racial hierarchy, is unique.22
In Part I of this Article, I will describe the extent and nature of the
racial disparities that exist in the juvenile justice system. Next, I will
discuss the concept of "otherness" in Part II. In Part III, I will discuss
the child as "other," which will be followed by a discussion in Part IV
of the impact of the "other" in the juvenile justice system. Finally, I
conclude that if white children were its predominant subjects, the ju-
venile justice system would look entirely different. It would focus on
rehabilitation and reeducation rather than its present emphasis on re-
pression, isolation, and control. 23
II. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The juvenile justice system is organized as a modified version of the
criminal justice system. Originally, juvenile courts were conceived of
as an alternative to criminal prosecution. The intent was to provide a
means to keep youthful offenders out of the criminal justice system,
which was thought to exert inappropriate influences over juveniles
and potentially endanger them.24 In addition, the purpose of the juve-
nile justice system was explicitly rehabilitative and reformative unlike
20. Id. at 1-3.
21. See infra notes 80-130 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 116-130 and accompanying text.
23. See infra sec. IV.
24. See MARY J. CLEMENT, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEIM: LAW AND PROCESS 10-22 (2d ed.
20(12).
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the criminal justice system, which had a predominately punitive
purpose.25
Actual juvenile court procedures vary from state to state, but in
general, the juvenile justice system can be said to involve six steps:
intake, detention, petitioning, waiver, adjudication, and disposition.26
At the intake stage, juvenile offenders are referred to the juvenile
justice system instead of being directed to social service, medical, or
family interventions. 27 While most cases are referred by law enforce-
ment, referrals may also be made by parents, victims, schools, social
workers, and probation officers.28 At the detention stage, the initial
decision to detain the child in a secure facility pending adjudication is
made by the court. The decision to file either formal charges or a
delinquency petition is the next step in the process, followed by an
adjudicatory hearing. At the adjudicatory hearing, a juvenile court
judge acts as the finder of fact and renders a decision as to the child's
involvement in the alleged offense following the presentation of wit-
nesses and evidence. At any time prior to a finding of delinquency, a
waiver petition may be filed, requiring a hearing to determine whether
juvenile court jurisdiction may be waived and the child may be trans-
ferred to an adult court for prosecution. At the disposition stage, a
judge determines the appropriate mix of services and sanctions to ad-
dress the child's adjudication of delinquency. Typical disposition or-
ders include placement in a secure facility, residential placement,
probation, counseling, drug abuse treatment, or restitution.
A. Racial Disparities and the Stages of the Juvenile Process
Racial disparities have been found at each stage of the juvenile jus-
tice system.29 Indeed, researchers have demonstrated that racial dis-
parities actually intensify with each successive stage of the juvenile
justice system.30 The overrepresentation of African American youth
in the juvenile justice system begins with the decision to arrest. The
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported that
2,603,300 juvenile arrests were made by state and federal authorities
in 1998.31 African American youth were overrepresented in the num-
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id. at 130.
27. See Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 4.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 4.
31. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Juvenile Arrests 1998
(1999).
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ber of arrests, at 26% of the total.32 African American youth were
also overrepresented in the referral population. 33 Of 1,755,100 delin-
quency cases referred for prosecution in 1997, 66% were white, 31%
were African American, and 3% were members of other groups. 34
Because African American youth only account for 15% of the coun-
try's population under the age of eighteen, the proportion of Black
youth shunted into the juvenile justice system is more than twice the
percentage of African American youth in the population. 35
African Americans are overrepresented, as well, at the next stage in
the juvenile justice process-the decision to detain. Figures show that
African American children are detained in locked facilities at a
greater rate than they are present in the referral population. In 1997,
44% of African American children referred to juvenile court were de-
tained, while only 31% of the referral population was African Ameri-
can.36 The treatment of African American detainees may be
contrasted to the treatment of white detainees. While Black children
are overrepresented among detainees in respect to their proportion of
the referral population, white children are underrepresented. 37 This
pattern of disparity is repeated across all offense categories, but it is
most extreme in drug cases. 38 In drug offense cases, African Ameri-
cans amounted to 55% of those detained, but only 32% of the referral
population.39 The disparate treatment of African American youth at
the detention stage is pervasive and readily apparent. Even when
charged with the same offense, African American youth are more
likely to be detained pretrial than white youth. In summary, "for
youth charged with comparable offenses-whether person, property,
drug, or public order offenses-minority youth, especially African
American youth, were locked up in detention more often than white
youth. 40
Following intake and the decision whether to detain a juvenile sus-
pect, a decision must be made whether to formally charge the youth
with the commission of a delinquent act.4 1 This charging decision is
32. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Crime in the U.S. 1998, Table 43 (1998).
33. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 9.
37. White youth were 66% of those referred and only 53% of these cases were detained across
all offense categories. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 10.
41. See generally, SANFORD J. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL § 32, 153-59 (3d ed.
1984).
[Vol. 51:679
THE CHILD AS OTHER
typically made by a prosecuting attorney. 42 In 1997, statistics revealed
that prosecuting attorneys were more likely to file formal delinquency
petitions against African American youth than against white youth.43
White youth were involved in 66% of juvenile court referrals and 63%
of petitioned cases.44 This means that cases involving white youth
were less likely to be petitioned than they were to be referred. Afri-
can American youths, on the other hand, were involved in 31% of
referrals and 34% of petitioned cases.45 This means there is a greater
probability that African Americans will be formally petitioned than
referred.
Another point of significant disparity in the juvenile justice system
involves the critical decision of whether or not the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court will be waived and youthful offenders will be prose-
cuted in adult court. Prosecution in adult court leads to harsher over-
all treatment and more punitive sanctions than are available in
juvenile court. About 8,400 petitioned delinquency cases, or about
1% of all petitioned cases, were waived from juvenile court to adult
court in 1997.46 Cases involving African American youth were dispro-
portionately waived to adult court.47 Almost half (46%) of waived
cases involved African Americans, compared to 34% of petitioned
cases.48 Half of the cases (50%) waived to adult court were brought
against white offenders, a lower proportion than the 63% of peti-
tioned cases that involved white youth.49 African American youth
were substantially more likely to be waived in cases involving drug
offenses and public order offenses. While 39% of petitioned drug
cases involved African Americans, 63% of waived drug cases involved
42. Some jurisdictions allow juvenile petitions to be filed by probation officers, or even by any
adult person. Id. at 154-55. However, the better practice reflected in most model provisions to
restrict charging decisions to prosecuting attorneys. Id. at 155. See also ISA-ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCE APPROACH 244 (Robert E. Sheppard ed., 1996)
(petitions alleging delinquency should be prepared and signed by the prosecuting attorney).
43. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 11.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. The proportion of Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, or Asians transferred to crimi-
nal court was five times or more the proportion of these groups in the general population in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island and more than twice the propor-
tion in the general population in the additional states of Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, and New
Jersey. Id. at 17.
48. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 17.
49. Id.
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African Americans. 50 For public order offenses, African Americans
were charged in 33% of petitioned cases and 56% of waived cases.51
Racial disparities are also evident at the disposition, or juvenile sen-
tencing stage, of the juvenile justice system. Juvenile court judges are
more likely to place African American youth in residential placement
facilities, and less likely to place African American youth on proba-
tion in comparison to similarly situated white youth.52 Although 32%
of cases adjudicated delinquent involved African Americans, a larger
proportion of those cases (36%) were ordered into residential place-
ment facilities than received probation (31%).53 Overall, white youth
were underrepresented among cases receiving residential placement
and overrepresented among cases receiving probation. 54 The dispar-
ity between white and Black children is present across all offense cate-
gories, but is even more substantial in the case of drug offenses. 55 In
cases where juveniles were adjudicated delinquent due to drugs, Afri-
can Americans made up 53% of those placed in residential facilities
and only 34% of those placed on probation.56 By contrast, white
youth comprised 45% of those placed in residential facilities and 64%
of those placed on probation.5 7
The cumulative affect of racially disparate treatment throughout the
juvenile justice system becomes clear upon entry into practically any
secure juvenile housing facility in the United States.58 The vast major-
ity of those housed in these facilities are persons of color. Youth of
color represented almost two-thirds of the detained and committed
youth held in 1997.59 More African American youth are in secure res-
idential placements than are juveniles from any other racial or ethnic
group. 60 In 1997, 40% of the juveniles in locked residential facilities
were African American, a percentage that is almost three times the
percentage of African American youth in the population. 6' As is the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 13 (Figure 5b).
52. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 14.
53. Id. (Figure 7).
54. Id. White youth made up 64% of adjudicated cases, 60% of residential placements, and
66% of cases receiving probation.
55. Id.
56. I. at 15.
57. Id.
58. See OFICE or JUVENILE JUSTICE ANc) DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MINORITIES IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1999) (showing a disproportionate number of children of color
were in residential placement in nearly all states in 1997).
59. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 18.
60. Id. (Table 9, showing comparisons).
61. Id.
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case throughout the juvenile justice system, the racial disparity in se-
cure housing is driven by drug offenses. African Americans constitute
the vast majority, that is 56%, of the juveniles in custody for drug
crimes.62
One reason for the large number of African American youth in se-
cure facilities is that the admission rate for African American youth is
substantially higher than it is for white youth. African American
youth with no prior placements are admitted to state public institu-
tions at a rate six times higher than that for similarly situated white
youth.63 African American youth with one to two prior admissions
are seven times more likely to be placed in state public institutions.64
This means that African American youth are much more likely to be
placed in residential placements than similarly situated white youth.
In addition to making up a disproportionate number of juveniles in
custody, African American youth are also held in custody longer than
white youth. On average, African American youth remain in custody
sixty-one days longer than white youth.65 For drug offenses, the aver-
age stay of African American juveniles was ninety-one days longer
than the average stay of white juveniles. 66 This disparity in the length
of stay strongly suggests that African American youth are punished
more severely than white youth for similar crimes. 67
These racial disparities begin early in the juvenile justice process
and build as the process continues. 68 Because African American chil-
dren are more likely to be arrested, more likely to be detained, more
likely to have their cases petitioned, less likely to be placed on proba-
tion, more likely to be ordered into secure facilities, and more likely
to receive longer commitments, it can be no surprise that African
Americans are found in juvenile facilities in such large numbers. The
stark racial disparities that are evident in juvenile detention and resi-
dential housing facilities may be traced to discretionary decisions
made at early stages in the juvenile justice process. 69
62. Id. at 19 (Table 10).
63. Id. at 20 (Table 12).
64. Id.
65. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 18, at 21.
66. Id.
67. Id. Using length of stay as the measure of punishment, Latino youth appear to be pun-
ished even more severely than African American youth. Overall, the average length of stay for
Latino youth in 1993 was 306 days, 162 days more than white youth and 71 days longer than
African American youth. Id. at 21.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id.
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B. Making Meaning of Juvenile Injustice
Why are these discretionary decisions made in such a way that is so
plainly adverse to the interests of African American youth? Why are
there so many examples of racial disparities throughout the juvenile
justice system that negatively impact African Americans? While ra-
cial disparities and differential outcomes are clearly evident, it is more
difficult to attribute the cause of these disparities to racial discrimina-
tion or to the racial bias of particular actors in the juvenile justice
system.
In part, this is due to the standard of proof required to ascertain
racial bias and the quality of available evidence to support a claim of
racial bias. As white Americans are increasingly reluctant to admit
and address claims of bias, a high burden of proof is required for both
formal and informal bias claims. 70 In general, individuals raising
claims of racial bias must identify a "smoking gun," either an admis-
sion of bias or a clear cut example of race discrimination with no rea-
sonable explanation.7' This high burden of proof requires relatively
specific evidentiary support.72 To establish racial bias as the cause of
the racial disparities in the juvenile justice system under such stan-
dards "requires analysis of detailed data providing information on
specific offense classifications, criminal history, and other factors used
in decision making. '' 73 This magnitude of proof is not yet available in
regard to the discretionary decisions of individual actors in the juve-
nile justice system.
70. See Girardeau Spaun, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (1990) (arguing that the
Supreme Court had responded to a conservative shift in majoritarian attitudes about race dis-
crimination by subtly incorporating contemporary attitudes into the constitutional & statutory
provisions that govern discrimination claims). See also Jody David Armour, Hype and Reality in
Affirmative Action, 68 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1173 (1997) (showing how affirmative action policies
revolve around knowledge claims of conservatives that discrimination no longer exists).
71. Julian Abele Cook, Jr. & Tracey Denise Weaver, Closing Their Eyes to the Constitution:
The Declining Role of the Supreme Court in the Protection of Civil Rights, 1996 DET. C.L. MICH.
Si. U.L. REV. 541, 565 (1996) (claiming Supreme Court decisions have imposed burden of pro-
ducing a "smoking gun" and left "no effective way ... to combat subtle racial discrimination
through the judicial process.").
72. As Professor Laurence Tribe has described,
[the Supreme Court's approach to race discrimination] sees contemporary racial dis-
crimination not as a social phenomenon-the historical legacy of centuries of slavery
and subjugation-but as the misguided, retrograde ... behavior of individual actors in
an enlightened, egalitarian society. If such actors cannot be found-and the standards
for finding them are tough indeed-then there has been no violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1509 (2d ed. 1988).
73. Id. at 4. The authors of this report point out, however, that many studies, including their
own, "suggest that processing decisions in many states and local juvenile justice systems are not
racially neutral." Id.
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The racial disparities alone are disturbing and shocking. When Af-
rican American youth represent 40% of the incarcerated youth na-
tionwide and in some areas almost 90% of incarcerated youth are
children of color, something is seriously wrong.7 4 When African
American boys consistently receive worse treatment at the hands of
police, counselors, psychologists, probation officers, and judges, some-
thing is seriously wrong. As juvenile justice advocate James Bell
states, "the nexus of color and adolescence have converged in a way
that have juveniles being confined in numbers that cannot be ac-
counted for by criminal activity alone and should give pause to any
civil society. ' '75
Some have argued that a great degree of racial disparities may be
traced to the shift toward more punitive sanctions in the juvenile jus-
tice system.76 They argue that the target of the juvenile justice system
is not so much African American youth as it is that African Ameri-
cans have become unintended victims-the collateral damage-of the
war on crime. 77 The real target, they claim, is the rising violence and
threat to property that has become endemic to American streets. 78
This threat has led to more punitive sanctions, less focus on rehabilita-
tion, and consequently greater numbers of delinquent youth being
detained.79
But the question remains: Why is it acceptable for African Ameri-
can youth to be viewed as merely collateral damage? Why is the cost
of requiring the mass incarceration of African American children not
considered too high a price to pay for the safety and security of the
74. See James Bell, Throwaway Children: Conditions of Confinement and Incarceration, in
THE PUBLIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN: POVERTY, VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE INJUS-
TICE 189 (Valerie Polakow ed., 2000) (reporting percentage of minority youth incarcerated in
California as 86%, and in Texas as 76%).
75. Id. at 188-89.
76. Barry Feld makes a version of this argument in at least two places. He argues that courts
and legislatures have been legitimately concerned with rising levels of juvenile violence, particu-
larly homicide. Because African American youth disproportionately commit violent crimes,
tougher measures that focus on these crimes are likely to have an unfortunate, but unintentional.
racially disproportionate effect. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case
Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 978 (1995). See also Marcy Ras-
mussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver, Policy and Practice: Persistence, Serious-
ness and Race, 14 LAW AND INEO. 73, 106 (1995).
77. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 76.
78. Feld and Rasmussen detail the concerns that motivated tougher juvenile justice policy,
notwithstanding its disproportionate impact on African American youth. They claim that "the
proliferation of firearms and the corresponding dramatic rise in homicide by mid- to late-adoles-
cents, the disproportionate overrepresentation of minority youth as perpetrators and victims of
violence, and increasing arrests of younger juveniles for violent crimes certainly justify public
concerns." Id. at 105.
79. See infra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
2002]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
socially significant and the politically connected? Why is it that Afri-
can American youth can be so easily sacrificed, predominately for the
benefit of communities in which they do not live? The answer is not
simply racism. Even a racist conspiracy by thousands of well-placed
and well-organized agents in the juvenile justice system could not ac-
complish the level of oppression that currently exists without the com-
plicity of the society as a whole.
The critical question, then, is not who or what is responsible for the
racial inequities in the juvenile justice system, but why so little is being
done about them? Why do the disparities look so normal, so un-
remarkable, as if it is entirely plausible that African American youth
would need to be incarcerated at a rate that is six times greater than
that for white youth? Why is it that we can look at Black oppression
and subjugation and fail collectively to be moved? This level of social
invisibility is only possible through a cultural process that affects the
perceptions of the entire society. The oppression of African children
appears normal because we have been socialized to undervalue the
lives and realities of African people. Consequently, white children are
more highly valued than Black children, and the disparities in the ju-
venile justice system reflect this differential value. In the next section
of this Article, I argue that this differential value can be explained by
a socially constructed process of "othering."
III. THE CONCEPT OF "OTHERNESS"
"Otherness," the concept that some human beings are different,
other, or alien, has been the subject of rigorous analysis and critique
in many different genres. Here, I will discuss four disparate sources
that have contributed to my understanding of the concept of other-
ness: the literature of poststructuralism/postmodernism and critical
theory, feminist theory, anticolonialist studies, and what may be called
African-centered scholarship. Each of these schools of thought pro-
vides important perspectives on otherness, yet none can claim to have
originated the idea.
One of the first articulations of otherness was W.E.B. DuBois' no-
tion of "double-consciousness." In an oft-cited passage of his 1903
classic, Souls of Black Folk, DuBois wrote,
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of
always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring
one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt
and pity.80
80. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8 (Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1903).
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Here, DuBois speaks of difference, but double-consciousness for
DuBois is not simply awareness that difference exists but the recogni-
tion that difference is despised. This passage also makes clear that
DuBois understood the other as a creation that arises out of a rela-
tionship of domination and subordination. The other is projected by
those who would want to dominate on a frame provided by those they
would want to subjugate. Thus, the African who is treated as the
other in America must view him or herself "through the eye's of
others" who have the power to set the standards by which "one's
soul," or one's worth may be measured. 81 The basic themes that Du-
Bois identified as central to the concept of double-consciousness-
conscious awareness of difference, a hierarchically ordered bipolar re-
lationship, contempt for the subordinate party in the relationship, and
projection of qualities onto the subordinate party by the dominate
party-have been followed by later scholars who have also addressed
the question of otherness.
A. Structuralists, Crits, and Postmodernists
The concept of the other became popular chiefly through the work
of early structuralists and later poststructuralists, critical theorists, and
postmodernists. Structuralists, mainly through their interventions
with language and linguistics, observed a polarized duality to Western
thought that shaped all aspects of culture and society. Structuralist
linguists identified terms of opposition within languages that provided
a structure within which meaning could be assessed. 82 This theme of
structural duality was picked up by later intellectual movements,
which uncovered dichotomies in Western thought as well. Writing in
the late 1970s, Jacques Derrida picked up the structuralist theme. In
Derrida's critique of the structuralist view,
Western thought has always been structured in terms of dichotomies
or polarities: good v. evil, truth v. terror, identity v. difference ....
These polar opposites do not, however, stand as independent and
equal entities. The second term in each pair is considered the nega-
tive, corrupt, undesirable version of the first .... In other words,
the oppositional categories are arranged in a hierarchical order.83
81. Id. DuBois wrote powerfully of the effect that this conscious awareness of difference has
on the psyche of those marked as other. According to DuBois, dissidence occurs as the other
seeks to maintain both his humanity and his difference: "One ever feels his two-ness-an Ameri-
can, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder." Id. at 8-9.
82. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE
PLATO 718-26 (Hazard Adams ed., rev. ed., 1992).
83. JACQUES DERRIDA, DESSEMINATIoN viii (B. Johnson trans., 1981).
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For Derrida, Western philosophy reifies sameness, and the agenda
of the entirety of Western thought-all philosophy, science, and law-
is "to reveal the essential characteristics that two things hold in com-
mon."' 4 In its very difference, the other subverts the perceived or de-
sired sameness that Western civilization takes as its foundation. In the
Western worldview then, the other is a thing to be feared. According
to Derrida,
Absolute fear would then be the first encounter of the other as
other: as other than I and as other than itself. I can answer the
threat of the other as other (than 1) only by transforming it into
another (than itself), through altering it in my imagination, my fear,
or my desire.8 5
Postmodernists who rejected the structuralist supposition that a fun-
damental order underlay all perceived reality also spoke of dualities
and polarities. Postmodern intellectuals, Foucault in particular, envi-
sioned a dialectical process of identity creation involving the other
that borrowed many features of the structuralist pairs of opposition.
Foucault argued that the Western world constructed categories of un-
desirables, such as criminals, the insane, and the sexually depraved,
"in order to normalize persons who are not constructed as members of
these categories. ' 86 According to Foucault, the other is created
through a process of social construction in which the other takes its
form through the normalization of behaviors and practices that are
desirable and thereby looked upon as unremarkable. Postmodernists
view the other as inextricably linked to the self, or that which is nor-
mal.8 7 The self is defined through the other; indeed, the self cannot
exist without the other 8s More precisely,
84. JOHN McGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND IS CRITICS 89 (1991)
85. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOOY 277 (Gayatri Spivak trans., The John Hopkins
University Press 1976) (1967) (citations omitted).
86. Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition of Child Custody as Civil
Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 738 n.2 (2000).
87. One postmodern scholar describes the interconnectedness of the self and the other in this
way: "The included and the excluded, the same and its other, are revealed as dependent on one
another within the larger dynamics of the constitution of identities within a social whole that
privileges some identities over others." MCGOWAN, supra note 84, at 121. Elsewhere, Mc-
Gowan remarks on Foucault's refusal to erect a new totality of otherness, a structure based on
the opposition of the other to the self. In this way, Foucault goes beyond structuralism. Mc-
Gowan states, "Foucault ... points us beyond the binary opposition of the same and its other
toward the larger economy of the discursive and social practices that create and enforce the
distinctions of (and hierarchies that stem from) the binary opposition." Id.
88. The self "is known as self only by its distinction from the other, which as other is un-
known." THOMAS McEVILLEY, ART AND OTHERNESS: CRISIS IN CULTURAL IDENTIITY 148
(1992).
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[t]he self is created by its apprehension of an other. The other is
created by its distinction from a self. They create each other and
sustain each other's existence. Each makes the other what it is.89
In political terms, postmodernists see the other as existing on the
margins of society, excluded from positions of power, and placed in a
subordinate position.90 The center is an invariable "presence," in
Derrida's terms, and a point of reference or authority from which
norms are established. Although the other, in the postmodern con-
ception, retains agency and the ability to impact the shape of society.9'
The other is "other" because it is viewed by the self as a field in which
the self's agency can work. The othfer is the servant to authority, and
it is to be dominated and controlled.
B. Feminism and the Other
Feminist scholars have produced a separate, although similar, treat-
ment of otherness than that of the postmodernists. The feminist con-
ception of the other may be traced to the mid-twentieth century
writings of Simone de Beauvoir. De Beauvoir observed that men
were represented as the norm in virtually every aspect of Western so-
ciety.92 Women, if they were considered at all, were described only in
comparison to males. That is to say, women were viewed as deficient
in the qualities that men had in the abundance. "He," de Beauvoir
wrote, "is the universal, he is the absolute. She is the other. ' 93 As
others, women were subjugated by men and excluded from the center.
Men accomplished this exclusion, and indeed justified it, through the
claim that women were mysterious and unknowable. 94 As mysteries,
women were the opposite of rationality and, thus, were others.
Women were also others because of their biological characteristics
and their social role as mothers and nurturers.
89. Id. at 147.
90. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166,
190 (1996) (describing focus on the other as a "political act" which "uncovers the hidden, the
oppressed, the violated, the denied").
91. For postmodernists, the center is not all powerful, nor is the margin without power. The
postmodern conception of power is fluid and relational, rather than linear and hierarchical.
Thus, "power is not simply the imposition of one party's will over another; it is not simply domi-
nation. Instead, [postmodern] scholars see power relations as constituted simultaneously by
both domination and resistance, with power frequently shifting as parties contest the terms of
the relationship." Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
427, 440 (2000).
92. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX XiX-XX (H.N. Parshley trans., 1993) (1952).
93. Id. at xvi.
94. Id. at 257.
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De Beauvoir viewed the women's state of otherness as a deficiency
to be overcome. 95 She believed that women should embrace the stan-
dards of the male center to become full human beings. According to
de Beauvoir, "if a woman seems to be the inessential which never be-
comes the essential, it is because she fails to bring about the
change. ' 96 For de Beauvoir, the assertion that there were essential
differences between men and women was based on an illusion.
Other feminist thinkers rejected the notion that women should
strive to become more like men.97 Rather than seek to erase differ-
ences, these feminists embrace otherness. Luce Irigaray, a psychoana-
lyst, argues that women speak from a unique subject position and
develop a distinct consciousness and awareness. Irigaray has found
meaningful differences in men's and women's approaches to each
other and to the world. Specifically, she states that "women privilege
relationships between subjects while men give priority to relations to
the object." 98 Irigaray urges women not to retreat from their other-
ness, but to use it as a foundation for a new paradigm for social rela-
tionships that would not produce the same anti-human effects that are
caused by the dominant patriarchy. Irigaray advocates the creation of
a new set of "intersubjective relations between the genders" that re-
flects a "just and communicative microsociety." 99
Carol Gilligan also traces women's otherness to fundamental differ-
ences in psychology. She argues that women are more caring, nurtur-
ing, and creative in their relationships, while men are more
individualistic, violent, and logic-centered. 0° For women to create a
meaningful self, Gilligan believes that they should adhere to an "ethic
of care" grounded in the nurturing female subject and modeled after
the mother's role."" Women's different values enable them to speak
95. Id. at xix.
96. id.
97. See Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical perspectives on Women's Human Rights and Strategies
for their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 799, 826 (1996).
98. Linda G. Mills, Feminist Phallacies: The Politics of Prenatal Drug Exposure and the Power
of Law, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1215, 1222 (2000) (citing LUCE IRIGARAY, I LOVE TO YOU:
SKETCH OF A POSSI1LE FELICITY IN HISTORY 130 (1996)).
99. Mills, supra note 98, at 1222.
100. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 21-23 (1982).
101. Id. at 98. Although the ethic of care is a moral perspective that some feminists con-
sciously embrace, Gilligan does not claim that it is a form of moral reasoning that is unique to
women and not accessible to men. See id. at 2. See also Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of
Death, 60 U. Pnri. L. REV. 971, 978 (1999) (stating "Gilligan premised her analysis with the
proviso that the gendered associations were not absolute and that the contrasts were presented
to demonstrate the distinctions between two modes of thought rather than to represent general-
izations about either sex").
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in a "different voice" and contribute something to Western political
and moral discourse that would otherwise be lost. 10 2
C. Otherness in Postcolonial Studies
The other is also addressed within the genre of literary and theoreti-
cal criticism that is known as postcolonial studies. 10 3 Postcolonial
studies confront the other within the borders of a number of dichoto-
mies, including colonial/postcolonial, metropole/colony, white/colored,
and civilized/savage. 10 4 Postcolonial studies arguably originated in the
anticolonialist writings of Frantz Fanon.'0 5 In Black Skins, White
Masks, Fanon asserted that "Negroes" were the other of the white
man. 10 6 That is to say, people of color were not viewed as real human
beings. They had no thoughts, no joys, and no historical presence.10 7
This reality, originally imposed by white invaders, was internalized by
the colonized, so much so that the colonized suffered from an inferi-
ority complex. According to Fanon,
[e]very colonized people-in other words, every people in whose
soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial
of its local cultural originality-finds itself face to face with the lan-
guage of the civilizing nation; that is with the culture of the mother
country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in pro-
102. Gilligan's thesis has generated significant controversy, both within feminist scholarship
and within developmental psychology. For a concise treatment of Gilligan's conclusions and the
objections to them, see generally Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers,
81 GEO. L. J. 2665 (1993).
103. Postcolonial studies or postcolonial theory is a school of cultural interpretation and cri-
tique that has developed with in the last twenty years, chiefly as a result of the work of Edward
Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak. See LEELA GANDHI, POSiCOLONIAL THEORY: A CRT-
ICAL INTRO1DUCTION 64-81 (1998). For background and analysis of postcolonial studies, see gen-
erally, id.; A COMPANION TO POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES (Henry Schwarz & Sangeeta Ray eds.,
2000); LAws OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (Darrien Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999); THE POST-
COLONIAL STUDIES READER (Bill Ashcroft et. aL eds., 1995); COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-
COLONIAL THEORY: A READER (Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994); and COLONIAL
DISCOURSE/POSTCOLONIAL THEORY (Peter Hulme et. al. eds., 1994).
104. GANDHI, supra note 103, at 32.
105. See FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (1965): FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN,
WHITE MASKS (1967); FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963); FRANTZ FANON,
TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
106. FANON, BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS, supra note 105, at 17, 188-89 (describing the Black
man as the representation of evil in the white mind).
107. Fanon cogently describes the privileging function of this otherness:
I meet a Russian or German who speaks French badly. With gestures I try to give him
the information that he requests, but at the same time I can hardly forget that he has a
language of his own, a country, and that perhaps he is a lawyer or an engineer there. In
any case, he is foreign to my group, and his standards must be different.
When it comes to the case of the Negro, nothing of the kind. He has no culture, no
civilization, no "long historical past."
Id. at 34.
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portion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards.
He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle.' 0 8
Following Fanon, Edward Said's classic work, Orientalism, was the
catalyst for the establishment of postcolonial studies as a discipline. 0 9
Said analyzed the construction of the Orient in the colonial and impe-
rialist discourse of the West. This social construction is what Said re-
ferred to as "Orientalism," a type of otherness "based upon an
ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient'
and . . . 'the Occident."' 0 According to Said, Orientalism possesses
four main characteristics, or dogmas: (1) "the absolute and systematic
difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane,
superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior";"'
(2) "abstractions about the Orient ... are always preferable to direct
evidence";" 2 (3) "the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of de-
fining itself";' 3 and (4) "the Orient is ... something either to be
feared ... or to be controlled."' 14 The othering process that Said de-
scribes may be extended to other binary relationships between the
West and colonized, or formerly colonized, people, and his method
has been adopted as a centerpiece of postcolonial theory.115
D. The Other in African-Centered Scholarship
African-centered scholars use their own concept of otherness to de-
pict the reality of the African condition worldwide." 6 Otherness
figures prominently in African-centered scholarship as an heuristic de-
vice to explain the cultural and political subjugation of African peo-
ple.1 17 Cheikh Anta Diop, the Senagalese intellectual and one of the
most important African-centered scholars, argued that Europeans and
Africans possessed distinctive cultural personalities. 1 8 While Afri-
108. Id. at 18.
109. GANDHI, supra note 103, at 64.
110. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 2 (1978).
111. Id. at 300.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 300-01.
114. Id. at 301.
115. GANDHI, supra note 103, at 64-65.
116. 1 identify African-centered scholars and describe their work in Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as
a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. 323, 328 n.18 (1997).
117. For an overview of African-centered scholarship and its treatment of the concept of oth-
erness, see id. at 329-338.
118. This was Diop's "two cradle" theory. See CHEIKH ANTA Diop, THE CULTURAL UNITY
OF BLACK AFRICA: THE DOMAINS OF PATRIARCHY AND MATRIARCHY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQ-
uITY 28 (English trans., 1963, reprinted 1978) [hereinafter Diol', CULTURAL]; CHEIKH ANTA
Dioi, CIVILIZATION OR BARBARISM: AN AUTHENTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 112-13 (Yaa-Lengi
Meema Ngemi trans., 1991) [hereinafter DIOP, CIVILIZATION OR BARBARISM].
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cans were generally oriented to communalism and xenophilia,
Europeans were generally predisposed to individualism and xenopho-
bia. 119 The cultural personality of Europeans, according to Diop, led
to the development of totalitarian states, misogyny, conquest, and
war. 120 African-centered scholars believe that European cultures en-
gender a particular psychology in those who live in those societies,
which produces "insecurity ... an incessant need to control, dominate,
or be better than others."' 121 This psychology, which Linda James Mey-
ers refers to as "sub-optimal," is an outgrowth of the materialistic fo-
cus of Western culture. 122 According to Meyers, the creation of others
has less to do with the essential or perceived characteristics of the
other, and more to do with underlying cultural dynamics:
Although two external criteria automatically make one "better" in
this system, white skin color and male sex characteristics, as long as
the conceptual system is intact, if it were not these particular exter-
nalisms, others would be found. The system by its nature inherently
leads to some form of societal "ism," or hierarchical valuing of the
material.' 23
Marimba Ani has produced a sophisticated and detailed African-
centered analysis of the process of othering in European civiliza-
tion.124 Ani argues that the othering process derives from the reason-
ing style that is embedded in European culture. 25 European cultures
employ a dichotomous reasoning style that divides objects into oppos-
ing parts in order to perceive them.126 According to Ani, this dichoto-
mous epistemology "begins with the separation of the self from
'other,' and is followed by the separation of self into various dichoto-
119. Diop, supra note 118, at 28-33, 144-46.
120. Id. at 139, 148, L95.
121. LINDA JAMES MYERS, UNDERSTANDING AN AFROCENTRIC WORLD VIEW: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO AN OPTIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 10 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Id. Meyers explains that the psychological dependence on material things is the conse-
quence of a cultural process:
Starting with the basic ontological assumption that the nature of reality is principally
material, we are set up for a world view in which the resources necessary for survival
exist in only a finite and limited amount (the pie is only so big). The process of life is
portrayed such that we must compete for the limited resources (aggress) to survive.
Highest value is placed on their acquisition. If we accept the materialist perspective,
even our worth as human beings becomes fragile and and diminished, for it teaches that
one's worth is equal to what one owns, how one looks, the kind of car, house, education
one has, and so on.
Id.
124. See MARIMBA ANI, YURUGU: AN AFRICAN-CENTERED CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN CUL-
TURAL THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR 29-108, 279-310 (1994).
125. Id. at 104-08.
126. Id. at 33.
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mies (reason/emotion, mind/body, intellect/nature)."' 27 Within the
Eurocentric mindset, "[t]he original splitting and separating mental
process assigns qualitatively different (unequal) value to the opposing
realities of the dichotomies."'' 28 Ani views this conceptual process as
culturally distinct with an emphasis on opposition. In her words,
First the dichotomy is presented, then the process of valuation oc-
curs in which one term is valued and the other is devalued ....
[U]nlike the Eastern (Zen) conception of the Yin and the Yang or
the African principle of "twinness". . these contrasting terms are
not conceived as complementary and necessary parts of a whole.
They are, instead, conflicting and "threatening" to one another. 129
The Eurocentric mindset that Ani describes is pivotal in the estab-
lishment of relationships based on domination and power, "for it is
this dichotomized perception of reality on which the controlling pres-
ence (imperialistic behavior) depends."' 130
E. Synthesis
The other owes its existence to a quirk of European culture:
Eurocentric, or Western, epistemology structures all knowledge into
oppositional categories, such as reason/emotion, mind/body, intellect/
nature, and white/black. These categories, as Ani, Derrida, and others
have emphasized, are arranged hierarchically so that one pole of the
dichotomy is "better" than its opposite. The other, then, is con-
structed from the lesser pair of the hierarchical categories that are
perceived in Western industrialized cultures. There are many addi-
tional features of otherness that are analyzed to differing degrees
within different intellectual traditions. However, the features of oth-
erness that are most important to my analysis and deserve emphasis
here are the following: (1) the other is a means of defining the self; (2)
the other is an abstraction; (3) the other cannot define itself; and (4)
the other is to be feared and controlled.
1. The Other Defines the Self
We must emphasize that the other is a means of conceptualizing the
Western self and that the dichotomies the othering process creates
are, thus, necessary and essential. The other, through opposition, de-
fines the self and makes knowledge of the self possible. In political
terms, the other makes the constitution of community possible and,
127. Id. at 105.
128. Id. at 106.
129. Id. at 33.
130. AN[, supra note 124, at 33.
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indeed, makes the solidarity of the dominant racial group a reality.
As Crenshaw writes,
Racism does not support the dominant order simply because all
whites want to maintain their privilege at the expense of Blacks, or
because Blacks sometime serve as convenient political scapegoats
T.... he establishment of an "other" creates a bond, a burgeoning
common identity of all non-stigmatized parties-whose identity and
interests are defined in opposition to the "other."' 131
2. The Other Is an Abstraction
Abstractions are the preferred form of knowledge of the other.
Those who conceive of the other have no interest in obtaining con-
crete knowledge about the other. The other is a social construction
that is necessary to serve the political function of organizing society.
Accurate information about the other is not necessary to serve this
political function. The "reality"of the other, to the extent it exists, lies
within the self and not within any external experiential world.
3. The Other Cannot Define Itself
The other, as a social construct, does change, but it changes at the
behest of the self. When the self changes, the other changes. The
other is an object acted on by the center/self. It is fixed vis-a-vis the
self. The other cannot define itself. It is defined by the self. This is
what makes the act of self-definition by outsider communities so de-
stabilizing to the existing order. Those who exist in the subordinate
position of the hierarchy cannot name and define for themselves with-
out usurping the power of the dominant and ripping the hierarchical
structure of self and other apart.
4. The Other Is To Be Feared and Controlled
As a manifestation of difference, the other is perceived as a threat.
As a threat, the other must be controlled. The establishment of an
elaborate structure of control then becomes a necessity. It is neces-
sary because the very concept of otherness symbolically demands it,
even if the individual or group marked as other poses no real threat at
all.
131. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372 (1988).
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IV. THE CHILD AS OTHER
The vast majority of the children in the juvenile justice system-
those that are Black or Brown-may be treated as others in two ways.
They may be othered as a result of their status as children, and they
may be othered because they are not white. Otherness derived from
both binaries contributes to the functioning of the juvenile justice sys-
tem and contributes to the increased harshness of that system.
A. The Adult-Other Binary
Children are other than adult, and by their construction, they also
produce the meaning of adulthood. Children are small, weak, imma-
ture, trusting, playful, and physically undeveloped, while adults are
big, strong, mature, skeptical, serious, and physically developed. Be-
cause children differ from adults, they are treated differently. How
they are treated, however, turns on how their otherness is constructed.
The child as other has two aspects, one positive and one negative. In
the positive conception of children's otherness, children are valued.
In the negative, they are not. Both negative and positive interpreta-
tions of the child as other exhibit the typical features of otherness. As
others, children define the adult self, are abstractions, cannot define
themselves, and are controlled.
1. The Positive Conception of the Child as Other
In the positive expression of children's otherness, children are
treated as inchoate adults, as beings with great potential that should
be nurtured and developed. 132 Children are represented as sweet,
kind, vulnerable, and, at least in theory, as special objects of attention,
love, and care. 133 They are valued for what they are, as well as for
what they can become. Children are to be protected from potential
harm and from negative influences on their emotional, moral, and
physical development.
As children are represented with these positive qualities, they are
represented as having qualities that adults do not have, qualities that
are transient and ephemeral; indeed, that is one reason why children
are viewed as special. In this way, children construct the meaning of
adulthood. If children are trusting, loving, malleable, and dependent,
then adults ought not retain these qualities. Clearly, these positive
132. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Age of Autonomy: Legal Reconceptualizations of Childhood, 18
QRL 421 (1999) (describing children as "innocent, fragile, and precious").
133. Vivana Zelizer describes this vision of childhood as one which constructs as "economi-
cally 'worthless' but emotionally 'priceless' child." ZELIZER, supra note 4, at 3 (1985).
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qualities of childhood are socially constructed. 134 Not all children are
trusting and loving. The view of children and the perceived qualities
that children are thought to exhibit change over time. 135 These quali-
ties do not change in response to quantitative research about chil-
dren's lives and thoughts. Rather, the view of children changes as
adult perceptions, attitudes, and consciousness change. That is, chil-
dren are abstracted by adults in response to adult needs.1 36
Children cannot define themselves. Even within the positive inter-
pretation of children's otherness, children cannot determine what it is
to be a child, what qualities children must have, and what qualities
children should not have. Indeed, the inability of children to define
themselves or their reality is one of the things that make them chil-
dren in the eyes of adults. This aspect of the treatment of children is
captured in the old saying, "children are to be seen and not heard."
Rarely in this society are children, even children who are loved and
valued, heard.137 Children are not allowed to vote and are not other-
wise allowed representation on political issues that are of the greatest
importance to them.1 38 In the case of children who are part of the
positive construction of childhood, this voicelessness is understood as
necessary for the child's own good. It is intended to protect the child
from the compromises and influences of politics and to prevent the
child from making decisions that may compromise the child's best in-
terests, as those interests are understood by adults.139
Although fear of the child is less important, control is an important
feature of the positive interpretation of children's otherness. A child's
lack of control and an adult's insistence on control is an expected part
of the representation of childhood. 40 Again, this insistence on con-
134. Id.
135. Id. Michael Grossberg details the way that courts have participated in the construction
of attitudes toward children and chlidhood and how these have changed over the years. See
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA (1995).
136. Several commentators have noted that the concept of childhood appears to be undergo-
ing change as the contemporary needs of adults are changing. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 132,
at 429-431; Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Patent-
Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 352-370 (1997); NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF CHILDHOOD 99 (1982).
137. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 84 (1994) (noting "the systematic exclusion of children from
legal personhood").
138. See id. (claiming law "fails to serve children's tangible interests in those issues of most
concern to most children, poverty and custody").
139. Id. at 89.
140. In Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court justified ex-
tending less constitutional rights to children than to adults due in part to "the importance of the
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trolling the child is justified as necessary to protect the child and as a
circumstance demanded by what is in the child's best interests. 141 But
because children do not think like adults, behave like adults, nor value
the same things as adults, children are also feared as potential agents
of change. The possibility always exists that the next generation will
not uphold and reproduce the institutions that adults have established.
Thus, children are feared and controlled until they have been properly
socialized and no longer represent a threat to adult institutions. 142
2. The Negative Conception of the Child as Other
The positive conception of childhood is not the only way that chil-
dren's otherness may be articulated. In addition to the positive con-
ception of the child as other, which values children, there exists a
negative conception that views children as a threat or burden. 143 The
negative perspective of children's otherness sees children as a drain on
scarce resources. 44 They are a drain because they are dependent, in-
experienced, and needy. Children require attention, love, training,
and material support, and although these needs may be considered as
necessary investments in the negative interpretation of children's oth-
parental role in child rearing." Id. at 634. Thus, the court in Bellotti required minors seeking
abortions without parental consent to first obtain court approval. Id. at 643. This primacy of
parental authority may be a legacy of the traditional view in European cultures that children
were the property of the parents, who could literally exercise the power of life and death over
them. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Per-
spective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 313, 313-314 (1998).
141. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 634 (asserting the "peculiar vulnerability" of children as
reason to require judicial approval to waive parental consent to minor's abotion).
142. The potential danger posed to existing institutions by children is one reason children
must remain under the tutelage of parental figures. The Bellotti court held parents had a "high
duty" to prepare their children for their obligations as members of society, including "the incul-
cation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Id. at 637-38. A
similar concern motivates the establishment of public educational institutions. Indeed, "[flor
Horace Mann, the primary force behind the common school movement, schooling for the young
was necessary to preserve republican institutions and create political community." Rosemary
Salome, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 169, 173-174 (1996).
143. Rochelle Jackson points out that "[p]rior to the 16h century, children were viewed as an
added burden" and the "[r]eported cases of mass infanticide were not uncommon." Rochelle D.
Jackson, The War Over Children's Rights: And Justice for All? Equalizing the Rights of Chil-
dren, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 223, 226 (1999). See also Barbara A. Kellum, Infanticide in
England in the Later Middle Ages, 1 HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD QTRLY. 367, 378 (1974) (showing
the prevalence of infanticide in 14th and 15th century England and concluding that "the feeling
that the death of an infant or a child is something less than a homicide," was characteristic of the
times). Jackson reports that as late as the 19th century, children were viewed as the embodiment
of evil, and "were often mistreated and abused as a result." Jackson, supra, at 227.
144. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923, 968 (2001)
(pointing out some think of children as a drain on environmental resources and an impediment
to career advancement).
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erness, they are simply seen as costs. 145 In addition, the negative oth-
erness of children poses a threat. Children need to be controlled and,
in the negative view of children's otherness, the child as other is
uncontrollable.
The negative otherness of children also shapes the adult self, per-
haps even more so than the positive interpretation of otherness.
While adults may exhibit some positive traits of children, such as kind-
ness and trust, the distinction between adults and the negative child as
other is much more stark. One becomes an adult to the extent that
one jettisons the negative attributes of childhood, such as lacking in-
dependence and being unable to take care of oneself.1 46 Children's
lower degree of intellectual development figures largely in the distinc-
tions made between children and adults. 147 Children, unlike adults,
are not able to think for themselves. Because they are not yet fully
developed intellectually, children do not think in the linear, rational
way that adults do, which is privileged in Western cultures. 148 Conse-
quently, children are not trusted with important decisions.
The result of the negative otherness of children is that children are
despised. Although the claim that children are valued is frequently
heard, there are also indications of a "pervasive and profound
prejudice against children that strongly suggests wholesale devalua-
tion. '149 One commentator has argued that, given the treatment we
afford our children, "it is not hard to conclude that our society hates
kids. ' 150 The negative treatment that children receive is significantly
connected to the perception of their otherness. All children are
others, but when children are the offspring of other people then their
otherness intensifies exponentially. As Professor Pamela Smith states,
Given our nations treatment of its children, it is difficult to argue
persuasively that we value children. Not "our" own children, of
course, because most of us purport to value our own children. But,
145. See Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 92, 94 (describing children as "physically weak, eco-
nomically dependent, uneducated and inexperienced" and claiming that "adult society does not
really like children" because children "impede the pursuit of audit work and play.").
146. Id. at 96 (arguing that "children differ from the legal model of personhood because they
are dependent on others for support").
147. Id. at 92 (describing children as "innocent and naive, if not foolish and short sighted").
148. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. 323, 336-337,
367 (1997) (describing European culture and worldview as producing and privileging certain
cultural constructs, including extreme rationalism, excessive abstraction, and doctrinal and ana-
lytic thought).
149. Pamela J. Smith, Reliance on the Kindness of Strangers: The Myth of Transracial Affinity
Versus the Realities of Transracial Educational Pedism, 52 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 8 (1999). Profes-
sor Smith refers to the profound prejudice against children as "pedism." Id. at 6.
150. David Nyhan, The Measure of our Respect for Children: Schools, Boston Globe, Aug. 24,
1997, at D4, cited in Smith, supra note 149 at 8, n.13.
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we do not value children in the collective sense, especially other
people's children. As we move away from our personal children,
pedism increases. 51
Children's otherness becomes negative when they are other peoples'
children. Then behavior and characteristics that would otherwise be
attractive and "cute" become frightening and threatening. 52 Re-
sources that would be readily expended as an investment in the future
are taken off the table when the beneficiaries are other people's chil-
dren. 153 Assisting other people's children, in the dominant view,
means helping to create potential competitors for your own chil-
dren. 54 Thus, when it comes to the treatment of children in this soci-
ety, there is a link between the otherness of childhood and the
otherness of race.
B. The White-Black Binary
In the United States, with its long history of racist oppression and
color-based social hierarchy, "race presents the most serious otherness
problem."' 55 The elements of otherness associated with African peo-
ple may be gleaned from the content of well-known racial stereo-
types. 156 The components of these stereotypes were developed within
a metaphysical and epistemological framework that constructed Afri-
cans as the opposing but inferior counterpart to the dominant
whites. 57 While whites "became associated with normatively positive
151. Id. at 7-8.
152. See Barry C. Feld, A bolish the Juvenile Court. Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 93 (1997) (arguing people exhibit hostility
toward "other peoples' children" because "they regard [them] as a threat to themselves and their
own children").
153. In a chapter entitled "Other People's Children" in his book on the American public
education system, Jonathan Kozol makes the point that most Americans do not support govern-
mental expenditures for the education of other people's children, even when that means that a
range of social problems that could be avoided through proper education persist. See JONATHAN
KozoL, SAVAGE INEOUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 40-82 (1991).
154. See Feld, supra note 152, at 93.
155. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 707 (1989).
156. The content of this stereotype is detailed in a wide range of scholarship, but is, at least to
persons familiar with American culture, virtually common knowledge. See generally, THOMAS F.
GossrI, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1997) (1963); GEORGE FREDRICKSON,
THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 1817-1914 (1971); WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER
BLACK: AMERICAN A-IrITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968); C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGF CAREER OF JIM CROW (1958); ST. CLAIR DRAKE, I BLACK FOLK HERE AND
TIIERE 28-30 (1987); JONATHAN KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 51-92 (1970).
157. See supra notes 8(1-86 and 116-130 and accompanying text.
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characteristics; Blacks became associated with the subordinate, even
aberrational characteristics."' 158
Consequently, Africans became defined as shiftless, lazy, unintelli-
gent, savage, childlike, immoral, oversexed, docile, superstitious, and
emotional. 159 While this classic stereotype has changed over time, its
basic parameters remain intact. 160 The Black stereotype as other set
the definition for whiteness. Whites were conceived as what Blacks
were not. In contrast to Africans, Europeans were defined as respon-
sible, industrious, intelligent, civilized, mature, moral, reserved, active,
rational, and intellectual.' 6 1 The existence of the Black stereotype
and the designation of Blacks as other constructed "whiteness"'' 62 and
allowed succeeding generations of immigrants to the United States to
be designated first as "whites" 163 and later as "honorary whites. '1' 64
158. Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1373-74.
159. See id. at 1373.
160. A recent poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago showed that 53.2% of white Americans polled viewed Blacks as less intelligent, 62.2%
of white Americans viewed Blacks as less hard working, and 77.7 % of white Americans partici-
pating in the survey stated they believe African Americans preferred welfare over employment.
See David K. Shipler, Seeing through Camouflaged Racism, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1997, at A21
(citing 1996 NORC survey). See also Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of
Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 602-609 (2000) (reviewing literature and
reporting several empirical studies showing evidence of contemporary racial prejudice against
Blacks); A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 155 (Gerald Jaynes & Robin
Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) (finding evidence of widespread bias against African Americans in re-
view of contemporary opinion research).
161. Crenshaw, supra note 131, at 1373.
162. See THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE 13 (1997); RICHARD
DYER, WHITE (1997).
163. Harvard historian, Orlando Patterson describes how the idea of race prevented solidarity
between oppressed classes of European Americans and their African American and Native
American counterparts, affecting later immigrant groups in the same manner. According to
Patterson,
[the idea of race incorporated] many immigrants of Europe who originally had nothing
in common with each another. An Irish potato farmer fleeing the famine, a German
metal worker, a Swedish peasant and an Italian working-class person, not to mention a
Sicilian, had absolutely nothing in common. But them they came to America and they
discovered this thing, this incredible construction, which was "whiteness," a race, a new
inclusive identity. This whiteness was of course an enormously valuable social asset,
and they eagerly embraced it. This positional good of whiteness, however, required the
presence of African Americans-the slave or ex-slave, the domesticated enemy, the
outsider within who gave meaning to "we the white people, we the true citizens."
Orlando Patterson, Interview with Orlando Patterson, Professor of Sociology at Harvard Univer-
sity, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 107. 110 (1999). See also NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BE-
CAME WHITE (1995); MAT-HEW JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT CODE: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 7-8 (1998).
164. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action. 15
B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 225, 249 (1995) (discussing "honorary white" status of Asians): George
A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LA-
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African kids are the bearers of a dual otherness. They are others
both due to their Africanness and their status as dependent, wild, and
uncontrollable youth. As children of the other, they gain none of the
positive benefits of childhood. They are viewed as threats, burdens,
and competitors to deserving children. As children, they gain no pro-
tection from the ravages of racist oppression. They still carry the
stigma associated with Blackness in American culture. As Pamela
Smith surmises,
Age or the vulnerability of youth does not shield Black children
from the reach of racism. Instead, Black children are just as much
the victims of racism's long-reaching effects as are adults. Indeed,
racism touches nearly every aspect of the child's life through dis-
crimination, poverty, unemployment, economics, education, and the
breakdown of the Black family structure. 165
V. OTHERNESS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Otherness manifests itself in the juvenile justice system both in the
way that youth are treated within the system and in the way the sys-
tem itself is viewed within the broader society. Perceived as others,
African American youth receive harsher treatment from actors within
the juvenile justice system. In addition, the way that African Ameri-
can youth are represented in the broader society has fueled a drive to
make the juvenile justice system tougher, harder, and more punitive.
This transformation of the juvenile courts has led to the observation
that we have somehow reached the "end of adolescence." In the re-
maining sections of this Article, I will explore how otherness affects
micro-level discretionary decisions made by actors in the juvenile jus-
tice system and macro-level policy decisions made concerning the
overall structure and purposes of the juvenile justice system.
A. Otherness and the Exercise of Discretion
Motivated by a fear of the other, the juvenile justice system has
always targeted other people's children. In fact, the system of juvenile
justice was first developed as a measure designed to address the threat
posed by poor children to propertied interests in newly urbanized
American cities. 166 Confronted by lower-class children who stole
from the middle and upper classes, progressive reformers developed
"houses of refuge" to "rescue such children from their inferior [social]
TINO L. REV. 321, 322 (1997) (discussing classification of Mexican citizens as "white" for immi-
gration purposes).
165. Smith, supra note 149, at 98.
166. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 48 (1992).
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settings and from potential pauperism by altering their 'weak moral
natures."1 67 According to some historians, juvenile courts were little
more than "expansive [social service] agencies of coercive social con-
trol that used their discretionary powers primarily to impose sanctions
on poor and immigrant children."1' 68
The new juvenile courts meted out discriminatory sentences from
their inception, "ordering more lenient treatment to children like the
judges' own and sending 'foreign' or 'alien' youth to institutions."1 69
This tradition of differential treatment on the basis of race and class
continues today. According to Schlossman and Wallach, "from the
early nineteenth century to the present, the juvenile justice system has
systematically singled out lower-class children for punishment and ig-
nored middle and upper-class youth."'170 One young scholar has ar-
gued that the current "overrepresentation of minority, particularly
[B]lack, youth in the juvenile courts and the disproportionate confine-
ment of minority youth in juvenile facilities may arguably be an exten-
sion of this process."'171 While the juvenile justice system may have
embraced more enlightened policies for European immigrants as they
became integrated into American life, these policies were not ex-
tended to African Americans as they replaced white ethnic groups as
the urban poor. 72 Instead, "African American youth, particularly
males living in poor urban areas, remain 'the ultimate out-group."1 73
Otherness would directly impact the racial disparities in the juvenile
justice system if the social constructed perceptions of African Ameri-
can youth were shown to influence judicial outcomes in individual
cases. The large degree of discretion granted to juvenile court offi-
cials, under the guise of parens patriae, provides plenty of latitude for
discriminatory conduct to occur.1 74 The construction of African
American males as others, and the attending stereotypes that this en-
167. Sacha M. Coupet, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric
and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1338 (2000).
168. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
56 (1999).
169. Coupet, supra note 167, at 1339.
170. Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Ju-
venile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. ED. REV. 65, 66 (1978).
171. Coupet, supra note 167, at 1339.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See SAMUEL WALKER, CASSIA SPOHN, & MIRIAM DELONE, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE:
RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 167 (2d ed. 2000) (stating researchers have suggested
parens patriae nature of juvenile justice system creates greater potential for racial discrimination
against juveniles than against adults).
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tails, may, and indeed should, cause juvenile court actors to replicate
the same bipolar classifications in their decisions by privileging whites
and disadvantaging Blacks. This othering of African American males
would not occur because it was inevitable or necessarily intentional,
but because the inferiority or deficiency (or in this case, delinquency)
of the African American would appear natural and unremarkable.
Barry Feld notes that "quite apart from overt discrimination, juvenile
justice personnel may perceive [B]lack youth as more threatening or
likely to reoffend [sic] than white youth and may process them
differently." 175
Other researchers have concluded that mechanisms similar to the
othering process are at work in the juvenile justice system. Secret and
Johnson, after reviewing juvenile court sentencing in Nebraska, sug-
gested that judges "may use extra legal characteristics like race to cre-
ate 'a mental map of the accused person's underlying character' and to
predict his/her future behavior."' 76 To date, however, there have been
few attempts to empirically verify whether differential treatment is
linked to racial stereotypes or racially prejudiced attitudes on the part
of judges or other actors within the juvenile justice system. 177
One empirically-based study entailed reviewing discretionary judge-
ments of Washington state probation officers during 1990 and 1991.
The researchers, George Bridges and Sara Steen, analyzed narrative
reports of juvenile probation officers in 233 cases. Bridges and Steen
found that the narratives painted widely divergent pictures of African
American youth and white youth. Controlling for the juvenile's age,
gender, prior criminal history, and seriousness of offense, the re-
searchers found that the attitudes probation officers held toward juve-
nile offenders were significantly influenced by the race of the
offender. According to Bridges and Steen,
probation officers described black and white youth and their crimes
differently. They tended to attribute crimes committed by whites to
negative environmental factors (poor school performance, delin-
quent peers, dysfunctional family, use of drugs or alcohol) but to
attribute crimes committed by African Americans to negative per-
sonality traits and "bad attitudes" (refusal to admit guilt, lack of
remorse, failure to take offense seriously, lack of cooperation with
court officials). 178
Bridges and Steen concluded that the different perceptions that juve-
nile probation officers had of African American and European Amer-
175. FELD, supra note 168, at 265.
176. WALKER, ET AL., supra note 174, at 173 (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 173-74.
178. Id. at 174.
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ican youth indirectly influenced juvenile court outcomes by shaping
predictions of dangerousness and assessments of the need for juvenile
court intervention. 79
James Bell explains how assumptions about African American
youth can result in their disproportionate arrest, detention, and incar-
ceration in the juvenile justice system:
[T]here are assumptions about youth of color that contribute to
their overrepresentation in the system. These beliefs hold that mi-
nority youth are prone to violence and criminal activity, they are
not in school or working, and worst of all they expect to be incarcer-
ated and therefore are not uncomfortable with being securely con-
fined. Such assumptions reflect an expectation of failure that in
turn is internalized by the young people who do in fact fail. 180
The social history of the juvenile court system challenges the notion
that recent changes in the assumptions and practices of the juvenile
justice system announce the end of adolescence. Rather, these
changes may simply illustrate the juvenile justice system's adjustment
to focus on children who were never privileged enough to be per-
ceived as adolescents in the first place. Other people's children, Afri-
can American children in particular, were always treated as dangerous
and threatening to the prevailing social order.
B. Otherness and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court
Within the last decade, a majority of states have moved to change
their juvenile justice policies. 8 By and large, these changes have
shifted the focus of juvenile courts from the rehabilitation of youthful
offenders to securing retribution and imposing punishment. 182 Legis-
lators have sought to make juvenile justice systems tougher by limiting
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and allowing juvenile courts to im-
pose more punitive sanctions on juvenile offenders. 183 Between 1992
and 1995, forty states and the District of Columbia restricted the juris-
diction of the juvenile court by enlarging the category of cases that
may be waived or transferred to adult court. 184 During the same pe-
riod, thirty-one states changed sentencing laws to allow juvenile courts
to impose more severe sentences. 85 In particular, legislators have en-
acted provisions permitting juvenile courts to impose sentences that
179. Id. at 175.
180. Bell, supra note 74, at 189.
181. Coupet, supra note 167, at 1319.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1319.
185. Id. at 1322.
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will hold juvenile offenders beyond the age of majority, eliminating
what was seen as a major loophole in the juvenile court's ability to
deter older juveniles from committing offenses.18 6 Additionally, forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia have made juvenile court
proceedings more accessible than they were previously, undermining
the veil of confidentiality traditionally afforded to juvenile proceed-
ings.' 87 Since 1996, eleven states enacted new laws either allowing or
requiring courts to notify school authorities of serious juvenile
charges. 188
These changes were motivated by the wide-spread public percep-
tion that the juvenile justice system, as it was traditionally organized
and operated, was not protecting the public from juvenile crime. 189
The belief that a failing juvenile justice system placed the public at
risk persisted, notwithstanding the fact that since 1994 juvenile crime
rates have, in fact, declined. 190 This belief that the juvenile justice sys-
tem was in crisis was only partially based on reality. Although violent
juvenile crime remained relatively constant over the previous two de-
cades, 191 it rose rapidly between 1986 and 1994 when it peaked at
1,230,000 reported cases. 192 Concurrent with this spike was a signifi-
cant increase in juvenile homicides, located mostly in a few urban ju-
risdictions. 193 Sensationalized media accounts of inner-city violence
played against this backdrop of a real and troubling increase in juve-
nile homicide to create an exaggerated threat to public safety. 194 Ac-
cording to Feld, "[t]he intersection of race, guns, and homicide fanned
the public and political 'panic' that, in turn, led to the recent get-tough
reformulation of juvenile justice waiver and sentencing policies."1 95
186. Id. at 1322-23.
187. Coupet, supra note 167, 1323-24.
188. Id. at 1324 n.ll0.
189. FELD, supra note 168, at 208.
190. Statistics reported by the National Center for Juvenile Justice show a 33% drop in violent
juvenile crime rates between 1993 and 1997, measured by juvenile arrests for violent index
crimes. Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, National Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Of-
fenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 62 (1999). See also PETER J. ELIKANN, SUPER-
PREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 26 (1999) (stating juvenile
violent crime "dropped more than 16 percent in 1995, 1996, and 1997").
191. See Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 190, at 75.
192. Id. at 62; FELD, supra note 168, at 200-02.
193. Peter Elikann notes that the rise in the juvenile homicide rate was not a national phe-
nomenon and was "very highly concentrated," since a third of the killings took place in just 10
counties and "84 percent of the nation's counties had no juvenile homicides whatsoever."
ELIKANN, supra note 190, at 26.
194. FELD, supra note 168, at 208.
195. Id. at 202-03.
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Conservative politicians, pundits, policy makers, and the media con-
tributed to the myth that juvenile offenders posed an enormous threat
to the well being and safety of the community. Like all other types of
social control, the juvenile justice system is highly politicized. 196 Play-
ing to the "get tough on crime crowd" helps politicians win elec-
tions. 197 Consequently, there is great pressure to exploit juvenile
crime, and even create a crime wave where none previously existed, in
order to reap the political benefits. Feld describes how politicians and
the media manipulated public fears in order to build support for more
draconian juvenile justice measures:
Within the past decade, the prevalence of guns in the hands of chil-
dren, the apparent randomness of gang violence and drive-by shoot-
ings, the disproportionate racial minority role in homicides, and
media depictions of callous youth gratuitous violence have inflamed
public fear. Politicians have exploited those fears, decried a coming
generation of "superpredator"suffering from "moral poverty," and
demonized young people in order to muster support for policies
under which youth can be transferred to criminal court and
incarcerated. 198
The transformation of the juvenile justice system became possible
and more urgent through the invocation of otherness. Central to the
development of the myth of a juvenile justice system in crisis was the
concurrent development of the myth of the "superpredator." Accord-
ing to some pundits and criminologists, juvenile crime was fundamen-
tally changed in the 1990s by the arrival of a new kind of juvenile
delinquent whom they called the "superpredator." More so than ordi-
nary juvenile delinquents, the "superpredator" is characterized as im-
moral, remorseless, and violent to the extreme. Former Drug Czar
William Bennett and his coauthors described the "superpredator" in
these lurid terms:
America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile "super-
predators"-radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters,
including ever more pre teenage boys, who murder, assault, rape,
rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs and create
serious communal disorders. They do not fear the stigma of arrest,
the pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience. 199
196. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial
Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 760 (1995) (describing the criminalization of conduct as a political func-
tion that determines "who shall wield state power, against whom, and for what purposes").
197. Coupet, supra note 167, at 1332.
198. FELD, supra note 168, at 208.
199. JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., WILLIAM J. BENNETT & JOHN P. WATERS, BODY COUNT 27 (1996).
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What is interesting about the myth of the "superpredator" is its reli-
ance on racist imagery and stereotypes. There is little difference be-
tween the description of mainly inner city African American youth as
"superpredators" and the historic representations of African Ameri-
cans as violence-prone, criminal, and savage.200 As Katheryn Russell
has astutely observed, "Blacks are the repository for the American
fear of crime."201 When most Americans think of crime they think of
a Black face.202 Many white Americans believe African Americans
are the cause of crime, and that when African Americans enter a
neighborhood, as residents or visitors, crime will surely follow. 20 3
Consequently, it is not surprising that some would believe African
American youth constituted a class of "superpredators," the control of
which necessitated a radical transformation of the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Indeed, in the minds of many, "superpredator" is simply a code
word for young Black males. 20 4
This outcome is precisely that which the theories of otherness would
predict. Thus, otherness effects not only the perceptions that officials
have within the juvenile justice system, it also effects the very struc-
ture of the system. Although Barry Feld does not employ the concept
of otherness in his analysis, his description of the transformation of
the juvenile court succinctly captures the role that the otherness of
African Americans played in bringing about harsher juvenile justices
policies. According to Feld,
[t]he recent transformation of the juvenile court provides a graphic
illustration of the conversion of public fear of and hostility toward
other people's children into harsh and punitive social control prac-
tices. The mass media depict and the public perceive the "crime
problem" and juvenile courts' clientele primarily as poor, urban
[B]lack males. Politicians have manipulated and exploited these ra-
cially tinged perceptions for political advantage with demagogic
pledges to "get tough" and "crack down" on youth crime, which has
become a "code word" for [B]lack males.2 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The transformation of the juvenile courts does not signal the end of
innocence. Rather it signals the continuation of historic perceptions
2110. See Nunn, Rights Held Hostage, supra note 10, at 64 n.I0 and accompanying text describ-
ing stereotype of the "Black savage".
201. KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME Xiii (1998).
202. Id.
2(13. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 196, at 770 n.142 (citing sources).
204. See FELD, supra note 168, at 337. See also JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY
(1996).
205. FELD, supra note 168, at 337.
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and policies toward African American youth. African American
youth never enjoyed adolescence in its full sense because they were
never perceived as the social equals of white children. Consequently,
African Americans in the juvenile justice system have always exper-
ienced discriminatory treatment. The changes in the juvenile court
system are not changes in the way that adolescence is perceived, but
changes in the perception of what class of children are serviced by the
juvenile court. With the understanding that the predominate clientele
of juvenile courts, at least in large urban areas, are African American
males, the idea of a juvenile court focused on rehabilitation and the
protection of the child became an unnecessary luxury. Driven by the
image of African American "superpredators," the juvenile justice sys-
tem was transformed into a harsh and punitive system of social con-
trol. For African American youth, however, this transformation only
represented an intensification of the oppression that they have always
endured in the juvenile justice system.
The distinctions between African American and European Ameri-
can children in the juvenile justice system and the subsequent change
of the juvenile justice system to a retributive model can be explained
by the concept of otherness, as it has been articulated by a number of
intellectual traditions. The transformation of the juvenile court
needed and commanded its own other, the "superpredator." The
"superpredator" was constructed as the ultimate other, as possessing
all the characteristics that innocent young children do not. The
"superpredator" was "brutally remorseless," incorrigible, and savage.
And because the "superpredator" was the antithesis of childhood, it
was slyly constructed as young, Black, and male. This racially charac-
terized "superpredator" was in fact a monster, and only the most seri-
ous and determined efforts could address the threat that the
"superpredator" posed.
The transformation of the juvenile court would not have occurred
were it not viewed in this way as a necessary instrument to address the
threat posed by the other. If the public perceived the juvenile justice
system as means of addressing the needs of white children, "our" chil-
dren in the public voice, then the juvenile court would be entirely dif-
ferent because at some level there is an understanding that "our"
children will someday grow up and become "us." But the children of
the other will never become "us," they will remain "them." As a re-
sult, they will receive discriminatory treatment no matter what theo-
retical justification underlies the policies of the juvenile justice system.
One day, when the current crisis is over, when the public's lust for
punishment has been satiated, and when the public realizes that far
2002]
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too many white children have been swept along by punitive policies
intended for Blacks, the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice sys-
tem will return. When it does, African American children may benefit
to some degree. But, by and large, most African American children
will not notice the difference. They will still be arrested, detained, and
incarcerated at higher rates. As children of the other, they will be
feared and controlled, rather than valued and loved.
